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Previous Volume 336:1752-1755 June 12, 1997 Number 24 Next

	Since this article has no abstract, we have provided an extract of the first 100 words of the full text and any section headings.

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Although transplantation is the best treatment for many people with end-stage renal disease, the gap between the number of organ donors and the number of potential recipients continues to widen.¹ Patients are often treated with dialysis for years while awaiting transplants, and many die.¹ At the University of Chicago, between 10 and 20 percent of patients with available living donors cannot receive transplants from them because of ABO incompatibility. We propose to increase the supply of organs by using kidneys from living donors who are ABO-incompatible with the intended recipients but are ABO-compatible with other recipients. Through an exchange arrangement . . . [Full Text of this Article]

Rationale for a Paired-Kidney-Exchange Program

A Proposal for a Pilot Study

Ethical Issues

Benefits and Risks for Donors

Benefits and Risks for Recipients

Coercion and Informed Consent

The Right to Withdraw Consent

Privacy and Confidentiality

Commercialization and Exploitation

Public Acceptance

Future Possibilities

Address reprint requests to Dr. Ross at the University of Chicago, MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics, 5841 S. Maryland Ave., MC 6098, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: lross@uchicago.edu).

References

Related Letters:

Paired-Kidney-Exchange Programs
Sells R. A., Ross L. F., Woodle E. S., Siegler M.
Extract | Full Text  
N Engl J Med 1997; 337:1392-1393, Nov 6, 1997. Correspondence

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