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As a state health official, I have often requested and welcomed the assistance of federal health agencies. However, I do not believe a federal takeover of the public health response to bioterrorism would be in the public's best interest. By virtue of their relationships with their communities and expertise cultivated through years of dealing with outbreaks of communicable diseases, state and local public health agencies are better able to lead the public health response to bioterrorism within their jurisdictions.
I agree that actions to prevent and respond to bioterrorism should be a federal priority. The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program is an excellent example of a federal response to bioterrorism that properly integrates the public health responsibility and authority of state and federal governments. I look forward to further such development of the federalstate partnership for preparedness for bioterrorism.
Michael Moser, M.D., M.P.H.
Kansas Department of Health and Environment
Topeka, KS 66612
mmoser{at}kdhe.state.ks.us
References
Anthony Robbins, M.D.
Tufts University School of Medicine
Boston, MA 02111
anthony.robbins{at}tufts.edu
Sergio C. Stone, M.D.
11 Estates Dr.
Villa Park, CA 92861
scstone{at}pacbell.net
To the Editor: Dr. Moser uses the term "lead role" in a way that invites multiple interpretations. He is correct that state and local agencies have been (and will remain) the first to respond to local outbreaks of communicable diseases. He is incorrect, however, if he believes that September 11 and the anthrax attacks did not change the jurisdictional identity of the lead agencies in trying to prevent and respond to bioterrorism. The lead agencies will be federal agencies because, as I noted, bioterrorism is inherently a matter of national security, even if the attack is confined to a single state. The precise roles of both federal and state agencies in combating bioterrorism remain to be worked out (and are complex, since the vast majority of public health problems do not involve bioterrorism).1 Nonetheless, federal agencies such as the CDC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the new Department of Homeland Security will have to take the lead in trying to prevent or mitigate a bioterrorist attack.
Of course, effective responses to a bioterrorist attack will require joint planning and close cooperation among local, state, and federal public health officials. In this regard, Dr. Robbins rightly emphasizes that public health officials must provide the public with honest and frank assessments of risk, not paternalistic reassurances. Unaccountable and untrustworthy public health agencies are not only ineffective, they can, as Dr. Stone understands, destroy both life and civil liberties.
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public Health
Boston, MA 02118
annasgj{at}bu.edu
References
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